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STOPPING HIGH INFLATION IN AN EX-SOCIALIST  
COUNTRY: THE CASE OF CROATIA 1993/1994∗ 
 





Croatian disinflation started in November 19931, after the October 
monthly rate of inflation reached more than 30%. The official 
measurement of prices 45 days after the announcement of the 
programme showed that the economy is in deflation. Deflation 
continued for 8 months up to now, with no significant impact on real 
output. In this paper we explain these events. 
 
By estimating the short-run (monthly) inflation equation which 
captures only rates of change effects, we show the hysteresis effect, 
i.e. the effect which pushed the economy out of it's equilibrium path. 
We show how it was posible for the economy to be in a permanent 
excess supply state, although in high inflation. So we explain post-
stabilization deflation: we present evidence on relative price variability, 
and we show that the deflation and it's magnitude can be explained by 
the high degree of synchronization in price contracts in a period of 
appreciating domestic currency. We emphasise the role of demand 
factors which influence inflation with a considerable time-lag, and 
which make effects of the post-stabilization monetary policy very 
uncertain. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Brief history of inflation, behavior of 
the main aggregates and main features of the programme, are 
described in section 1. A special emphasis is given to the role of 
budget deficit.  In  section  2  we  put  things together into a short-run 
                                                          
∗ Paper for the Third EACES Conference, Budapest, September 1994. 
1 The Government publicly announced the begining of the stabilization programme 
on October 4th 1993. 
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inflation function. First we develop a simple model which describes the 
international reserves maximization behavior of the Central Bank, and 
than we discuss the estimation procedure. In section 3 we investigate 
the role of price contracts and price rigidities. In section 4 we discuss 
two striking problems for policy makers in the post-stabilization period: 
changes in the demand for money and the level of the real echange 
rate. In section 5 we derive conclusions with special emphasis given to 
the nature of the post-socialist economy. 
 
 
1. The history of Croatian inflation: behavior of main 
      aggregates and main features of the programme 
 
History of inflation 1990:1 - 1993:10 
 
Figure 1 depicts aggregate price behavior during 53 months, from 
January 1990 to May 1994. In December 1989 last ex-Yugoslav 
Government launched a stabilization programme. Prices stabilized in 
April 1990, but inflation reemerged in September and October the 
same year. Dynamics of real money balances and households' sector 
real incomes, depicted in figures 2 and 4, indicates that this was a 
period of excess demand created by loose monetary and incomes 
policy.2 
 
Real money balances and real incomes started to decline in the second 
half of 1990 due to increase in prices. Figure 2 shows that real money 
deflated by domestic prices declined gradually, whereas real money 
deflated by the exchange rate declined in descrete steps during 1990 
and most of 1991, due to Government's attempt to retain fixed 
exchange rate policy. But Government was forced to adjust the 
nominal exchange rate by devaluating the official rate. That happened 
twice - in January and April 1991. 
                                                          
2 Note That variables have been measured relatively to the January 1990, the base 
month. For more details on calculations see the Data Appendix. 
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This policy influenced the real exchange rate which also moved in 
descrete steps (figure 3) due to gradual growth of domestic prices and 
discrete devaluations of the nominal exchange rate. That is why real 
exchange rate reached it's minimum in September 1991.3 And that was 




                                                          
3 We used a simple calculation for the real exchange rate. Changes in the real 
exchange rate (re) are calculated as: 
ret =et /pt 
where et = Et /Et-1 is depreciation of local currency to D-mark expressed in the ratio 
form, and pt =Pt /Pt-1 is inflafion (deflator) in the ratio form. This expression is 
sensitive neither to German inflation, nor to exchange rates and inflations in other 
countries, but it approximates more sofisticated calculations of real efective 




From that moment, The National Bank of Croatia (NBC) acted 
independently from The National Bank of ex-Yugoslavia, and therefore 
it allowed for 300% official devaluation in October 1991. New Croatian 
currency - Croatian dinar was introduced in December. At that time 
NBC didn't have any foreign exchange reserves at the disposal.4 
Although the C-dinar/D-mark exchange rate was held fixed during the 
first three months of 1992, devaluation was allowed in April 1992. 
Inflation was somewhat lower in the first months of 1992 due to the 
fixed exchange rate, but since April inflation started to rise. 
 
Inflation growth in the period 1992:4 - 1993:10 was accompanied by 
the growth of the foreign excchange reserves. The growth of reserves 
is depicted in figure 5. Maximizing the reserves was the objective 
function of the NBC decision-makers. This kind of behavior was 
perfectly logical for monetary authorities in a newly emerging 
independent country. Since price of the foreign exchange was more or 
                                                          
4 Substantial foreign reserves of ex-Yugoslavia were blocked by the Serbian regime 
in Belgrade. 
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less regulated by the NBC at that time, the monetary authorities 
enjoyed discretion in planning both nominal money growth and rates 
of depreciation. Their reserves maximization problem was constrained 
only by price and output reactions by other economic agents. So, the 
reserves were maximized subject to some level of inflation which 
policy-makers perceived as "acceptable". Nowadays, looking backward, 
we can speculate that it was the monthly inflation rate between 25% 
and 30%. This was the level inflation actually never broke up. From 
the middle 1992 till October 1993 monthly inflation rates were 
oscilating arround that level, and the inflation trend didn't show any 
propensity to increase. We will put these considerations into a more 
formal context in the next section.5 
 
                                                          
5 It may seem that depreciation is not compatible to the reserves maximization 
hypothesis because the central bank has to pay more for a unit of foreign 
currency. However, fixing the exchange rate or even apreciating it in the middle of 
inflation process without announcement of the overall change in the economic 
policy regime, is not credible. The black market rate depreciaties more than the 
official rate and the agents do not want to sell foreign currency to comercial banks 
any more. That is why central bank had to depreciate the currency in order to 
maximize reserves. 
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Now it is important to notice that the inflation constraint on money and 
exchange rate decisions created pressure for excess demand to 
decrease. Figures clearly show the decrease in real money balances, 
real incomes and real exchange rate till October 1993. The explanation 
is that in this kind of high inflation process, which is independent of the 
GDP level effect, current change in prices depends on past changes in 
prices and, in some way, on current depreciations6 or/and the rate of 
growth of money supply. Within such a setting, real demand variables 
tend not to grow, and under certain informational assumptions, they 
even tend to fall. We will also put these considerations into a more 
formal context in the next section. It is important to note that in the 
kind of inflation process where monetary authoroties maximize 
reserves subject to inflation constraint, decrease in real money is 
stronger than decrease in demand for money. We elaborate this 




The main features of the stabilization programme 
 
On the 4th of October Government announced a heterodox 
programme which contained following measures: 
 
1. Upper intervention point" for the exchange rate was 
announced to be 4444 C-dinars per DEM in October (21 higher 
rate than the rate on the 1 st of October), 4650 C-dinars per 
Dem in November and 4800 C-dinars per DEM in December. 
2. Money supply rule was announced to be 21 % increase in 
October (same percent as the initial devaluation), and 3% per 
month till the end of the year. 
3. The NBC discount rate was set at 7% per month initially 
(during October it was revised and set to 3% per month). 
                                                          
6 Depreciation plays a role because buildinig the foreign exchange clause into price 
contracts is the cheapeast way to protect from losses due to drops in relative 
prices. 
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4. Incomes policy rule was announced to be 22% net wage 
increase for October, and 3% for November and December. 
Government had enough bargaining power to stop backward 
looking wage indexation, and the rates were applied to the 
payroll at the enterprise level, but only for the state 
enterprises. 
5. A new foreign exchange law was passed to the Parliament (and 
adopted in the middle of October). It contained liberalization of 
the foreign exchange market and introduction of the internal 
convertibility. 
 
The measures were mutually consistent and their nature was foreward-
looking. All of them interrupted backward-looking behavior (inertia) 
and turned it into the foreward-looking one. One might ask why was 
the 3% per month chosen to be the critical foreward-looking 
information? The answer lies in the policy-makers' beliefs. They were 
not sure about the nature of the inflation. Although they knew it was 
mainly expectations driven inflation, they suspected that there is some 
(positive) inflation level consistent with the budget deficit. They even 
used the figure of 3% in their public statements, and they proclaimed 
it to be a policy target within six months (till March 1994). However, 
the private economic agents reacted much faster. 
 
The demand for money increased at the very begining of the 
programme, and from the middle of October till the end of the year 
1993, the nominal exchange rate appreciated from 4444 to 3800 C-
dinars per DEM. During the first half of 1994 it stabilized at the level of 
3650-3700 C-dinars per DEM. The new Croatian currency, Kuna, was 
introduced in May 1994, and the rate was 3.7 per DEM. The path of 
appreciation was convex, and the path of the real exchange rate 
(figure 3) shows that the cost of disinflation measured in terms of loss 
in international competitiveness (real apreciation), was paid at the very 
begining of the programme - prior to November 1993. Since then, real 
exchange rate depreciatied slightly because prices followed the 
exchange rate path, and they started to decrease in nominal terms. 
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This scenario calls for more carefull elaboration of the role of the 
budget deficit. Even policy makers believed that the level of budget 
deficit would require some positive rate of inflation after disinflation. 
 
 
The role of budget deficit 
 
It is well known that budget deficits accompany high inflations. In the 
last three years Croatia had a budget deficit due to the war and the 
burden of refugees, but it's size is subject to speculations due to lack 
of reliable data. That is why we tried to estimate it indirectly, by 
analysing the degree of it's monetization. 
 
Real money holdings (M/P) are taxed by the rate of inflation (π), so 
that inflation tax revenue (R) can be written as: 
 
R = π(M/P)    (1) 
 
This equation, however, holds only in equilibrium conditions when the 
rate of inflation equals the rate of growth of monetary base. So, for 
empirical purposes we use alternative formula for seigniorage. 
Seigniorage is, simply, a real value of the new money in period t7: 
 
   St = (dM/dt)/P         (2) 
 
Multiplying eq. 2 by M/M gives: 
 
            St = ((dM/dt)/M)(M/P)         (3) 
 
Seigniorage is a budget revenue, because the state is a monopolist 
supplier of money. And that is why M in eq. 2 and 3 stands for high 
                                                          
7 According to Fischer (1982), seigniorage made 1% of GDP in 14 industrialized 
countries 1960-1978. And according to Cagan, in European hyperinflations in 
1920's it made nearly 10% of GDP. 
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powered money. In the following analysis we will use simbol H instead 
of M. 
 
In order to estimate the importance of seigniorage for budget revenue 
in high inflation, we have to take into account the impact of inflation 
on regular public revenues. Tanzi (1978) had shown that the optimal 
rate of inflation for maximization of tax revenues is much lower than 
the optimal rate of inflation for maximization of the inflation tax. That 
is why we have measured the seigniorage rate in two ways. First, we 
estimated shares of monthly nominal increases of high powered money 
in nominal monthly GDP, which is the same as seigniorage/real GDP 
ratio: 
 
SSHARE1 =((dH/dt)/P)/(GDP/P) = (dH/dt)/GDP  (4) 
 
Second, we have measured shares of monthly changes of high 
powered money in total public revenues which include seigniorage 
itself: 
 
SSHARE2= (dH/dt)/(T+ (dH/dt))    (5) 
 
Table below shows quarterly results which are obtained as simple 
averages of monthly results within a quarter. Basic data and monthly 




The first column shows quarterly decreases of shares of M1 in GDP. 
The second column shows shares of total government revenue in GDP. 
Maximum shares in the last quarter of 1993 and the first quarter of 
1994 show the inverse Tanzi-Oliveira effect, and reflect increased 
financial discipline which accompanied stabilization programme. Third 
and fourth column show seigniorage rates (SSHAREI and SSHARE2). 
Seigniorage share in GDP increased during 1992, after Croatia 
introduced it's own currency, and it reached it's maximum of 10% in 
GDP (21% in total public revenue respectively). After that, high 
inflation continued, and the shares declined. Average share of 
seigniorage in GDP for the whole period was 7.7%, and the average 
share in total government revenue was 15.5%. 
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There are two errors that prevent jumping into the conclusions at this 
stage of analysis. The first is a measurement error regarding monthly 
GDP estimates. These estimates are heavily biased downwards8. That 
makes ratios which contain GDP in denumerator biased upwards. 
Second error is due to assumption regarding the structure of high 
powered money. Up to now we assumed that the budget deficit is the 
only reason for creation of the high powered money. However, the 
budget deficit (DEF) can be financed by borrowing at the domestic or 
foreign financial markets (D), by borrowing from the central bank (H), 
or by decrease in international reserves (B): 
 
DEF = dD/dt + dH/dt - E(dB/dt)   (6) 
 
where E is the exchange rate. So, by looking at eq. (6), we can 
interpret the assumption as: dD/dt=0 and E(dB/dt)=0. While dD/dt=0 
is a reasonable assumption because of underdeveloped domestic 
capital markets and closed doors of international financial institutions 
for Croatia, the second assumption cannot hold at all. The international 
reserves were growing fast from the begining of 1992, and so we have 
to rewrite eq. (6) as: 
 




dH/dt = DEFt + Et(dB/dt)   (8) 
 
In words, changes in high powered money were induced by budget 
deficit and changes in international reserves. 
 
Our final analysis starts from eq. (7). DEFt is the size of monetized 
deficit in month t. Et is the average monthly local currency/USD 
exchange rate, and dB/dt is monthly change in dolar value of the 
                                                          
8 For more about it see the comments bellow tables in the appendix. 
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international reserves at the disposal of NBC. Quarterly averages are 





These data obviously suggest much lower monetized budget deficit. 
During 1992 the average share of monetized deficit in total 
governement revenues was 13.1 %, and 6% in GDP. During 1993 the 
average share of monetized deficit in total government revenues was 
2.6%, and only 1.1 % in GDP. In some quarters the data have 
negative values, meaning current budget suficit. These results suggest 
that the budget deficit might be one of the main reasons for inflation 
to jump to a higher level in the first half of 1992. However, from the 
middle 1992 inflation was driven by other mechanisms. Data for the 
first quarter of 1994 prove the existence of inverse Tanzi effect, and 
indicate that one of the reasons for stabilization success can be found 




2. Putting things together: a simple model and estimation  
    of the inflation equation 
 
A simple model 
 
The descriptive part of the paper clearly points to the fact that we are 
dealing with an economy in which the inflation was going on at 
extremely high rates, inspite of the difference between levels of actual 
and potential output and inspite of the questionable role of monetized 
part of budget deficit. Such behavior of the inflation is what is named 
as hysteresis effect in the new keynesian literature (Gordon, 1990). 
Prices are driven exclusively by inertia and rates of change effects. Let 
us now briefly show that effect using Gordon's notation. 
 
Let x = p + q be the rate of change of nominal GDP which is 
expressed as the sum of rates of change of aggregate price level and 
aggregate real output. By subtracting the long-run equilibrium growth 
rate q' from both sides of the rate of growth equation, we get: 
 
X – q* = p + (q - q*)           (9) 
 
The expression shows that the excess of nominal GDP growth rate can 
be decomposed into the inflation rate component (p) and real output 
deviation rate component (q – q*). Taking it another way, and stating 
that the inflation rate is equal to some (constant) part of the excess 
nominal GDP, we can write: 
 
p = α (X - q*)     (10) 
 
Furthermore, inflation reacts to supply shocks which we put in the 
error term ε, and inflation is subject to inertia, i.e. it depends on it's 
own lagged value. So, finally we write the general form of the inflation 
rate equation which captures only inertia, and rates of change effects: 
 
   pt = λpt-1 + α(x – q*)t + εt             (11) 
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In order to estimate the equation for Croatia, we have to give a real 
meaning to the second variable on the right hand side of the equation 
(3). So we need to: (a) construct the variables for estimation, and (b) 
theoreticaly prove how is it posible for real values of demand variables 
to decline. We do both things simultaneously. 
 
Since we are building a theoretical model, we omit the error term for 
now. Second, assume that we are dealing with the small, open 
economy and decompose the nominal excess demand rates of change 
into nominal excess domestic demand (superscript d) and foreign 
(superscript f) demand rates of change. Write then: 
 
α (x – q*) = α ((xd-q*d) + (xf-q*f)   (12) 
 
Furthermore, assume (xdq*d) = 0, so that α(x – q*)= α(xf-q*f). Nominal 
excess demand that comes entirely from the foreign sector depends on 
the rate of nominal depreciation (e): 
 
(xf–q*f) = βe     (13) 
 
Substituting (13) into (12), (12) into (11), and taking into account the 
assumption of zero domestic excess demand, gives the expression: 
 
pt = λpt-1 + γet    (14) 
 
where y=αβ. We use eq. (14) to analyse the behavior of real demand 
variables under different informational assumptions. 
 
Interpret eq. (14) as a price rule which says that the current inflation is 
some combination of past inflation and current depreciation. 
Furthermore, we impose an additional parametar constraint which 
states that current inflation rate is a linear combination of past inflation 
rate and current nominal depreciation. 
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This restriction on parameters allowed us to assume that eq. (6) is 
expressed in ratio form, so that pt = pt/pt-1, etc. Devide eq. (14) 
through by pt in order to obtain the expression for the change in the 
real exchange rate: 
 
et/pt = (1 – (λpt-1/pt))/γ    (15) 
 
Obviously, we have to assume γ>0. If γ=0 would be the case, eq. (15) 
would equal plus infinity. That is, since γ=0 implies λ=1, current 
inflation is always equal to past inflation, and it is posible to increase 
the nominal exchange rate without any impact on prices. Stationary 
price equilibrium is not linked to the exchange rate then. This 
contradicts both real world events and theory, so we assume γ>0. 
 
Now we investigate the behavior of the model for possible λ, and γ, 
and we introduce a crucial behavioral restriction into the model. In the 
first section we argued that the policy makers wanted to maximize the 
international reserves level (which positively depends on nominal 
money supply and exchange rate growth, given capital inflow), subject 
to the inflation constraint, i.e. subject to the reactions of private 
economic agents. Namely, policy makers wanted to keep the monthly 
inflation rate below some threshold which they perceived to be the 
upper boundary of inflation tolerance interval. They simply wanted to 
avoid explosion of expectations which would lead to accomodation of 
monetary aggregates to much higher inflation level. Analysis of the 
structure of changes in high powered money strongly supports this 
behavioral assumption. 
 
Having in mind this behavioral constraint, the model works as follows. 
Assume that we start from the zero rate of inflation (pt-1=1). Monetary 
authorities control nominal depreciation, and private economic agents 
induce inflation by their reactions to new informations. Monetary 
authorities maximize the present value of reserves with a discount 
factor high enough to induce them to depreciate in the first period as 
much as posible. The maximum rate of depreciation in the first period 
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is constrained only by induced inflation. Since monetary authorities 
know parameters λ and γ, they can calculate the rate of nominal 
depreciation which produces inflation rate equal to the given upper 
limit of the inflation tolerance interval. Given pt-1 = 1, and pt=pt*, 
where pt* is a predetermined upper limit of the inflation rate, monetary 
authorities can derive maximum rate of nominal depreciation written 
as: 
 
et = (pt*-λpt-1)/γ    (16) 
 
Even without sophisticated algebra, a reader can verify that the real 
exchange rate (or any other real demand variable) cannot grow in the 
long run. Investigate first the case where γ=1, λ=0. From eq. (15) it 
follows that (pt-1/pt) term can be disregarded, and eq. (15) equals one; 
the real exchange rate would be constant, because changes in the 
nominal exchange rate would be directly transmitted into prices, 
without time lag. In terms of eq. (16), this parameter combination 
leads to et=pt* which clearly implies a constant real exchange rate. 
 
For other combinations of parameters, it is easy to see that after the 
initial (nominal and real) depreciation, which brings inflation rate to the 
upper limit, real exchange rate stays constant at the new level as long 
as (pt-1/pt) = 1 is valid. Values of parameters determine the real 
depreciation. Stronger inertia makes higher levels of real exchange rate 
attainable, and vice versa. Generally, for high values of λ, and low 
values of γ, real depreciation will be higher than for inverse 
combinations of parameter values. 
 
However, the real exchange rate can even decline if we allow for 
slightly diferent set of informations influencing the inflation process. 
Assume that producers taking price decisions decide, for whatever 
reason, to take into account the average of past and current 
depreciation, so that eq. (14) now becomes: 
 
pt = λpt-1 + γ(et+et-1)/2      (17) 
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and eq. (15) becomes: 
 
et/pt = (2-2λ(pt-1/pt))/γ - et-1/pt    (18) 
 
By multiplying eq. (18) with pt, we obtain expression monetary 
authorities use for determination of the nominal depreciation: 
 
         et = 2(pt*- λpt-1) /γ - et-1       (19) 
 
In the same manner we can derive equations of the type (19) for other 
exchange rate depreciation lag structures. For example, if private 
economic agents take two lags into account, eq. (19) becomes: 
 
et = 3(pt*- λpt-1) /γ - et-1 - et-2    (20) 
 
If they take three lagged values into account, equation becomes: 
 
et = 4(pt*- λpt-1) /γ - et-1 - et-2 - et-3   (21) 
 
Figures 6 and 7 present simulation results for real exchange rate index 
(IRER), for different parameter combinations and different lag 
structures. Equation (16) is used for obtaining the results for model 1 
in both figures. Equation (19) is used for obtaining model 2 results, eq. 
(20) for model 3 results, and eq. (21) for model 4 results. Simulations 
were executed for 18 time periods, the first period beefing a base one 
(=100), and for two parameter combinations. The first combination 
(fig. 6) is λ=0.5, γ=0.5, and a second one (fig. 7) is λ=0.3, γ=0.7. In 
both cases we assumed upper limit inflation for monetary authorities to 
be 25% per period (pt* =1.25). 
 
There are three important results. First, model 1 results in both cases 
indicate an increase in the real exchange rate which happens in the 
first period. In all subsequent periods the real exchange rate remains 
unchanged. Real exchange rate increase is possible because inflation 
lagged  one  period is lower than the upper limit inflation, and nominal  
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depreciation can be higher than that limit. The magnitude of real 
depreciation depends on strenght of inertia. Stronger inertia (fig.6) 
allows for higher initial real depreciation. 
 
Second, the introduction of lagged nominal depreciations into inflation 
equation, produces a downward trend. Real exchange rate tends to 
appreciate after initial depreciation, with oscillations arround the trend. 
Oscillations are strong at the begining, but as the time passes, they 
tend to be weaker. 
 
Third, oscillations tend to be stronger for higher values of the inertial 
parameter. Higher inertia opens room for bigger initial real 
depreciations, but later it leads to stronger apreciation of the real 
exchange rate. 
 
Generally, the model justifies the use of lags in construction of 
explanatory variables. And what is the most important result, it 
predicts that in an economy with strong inertia (high λ), and reserve 
maximization behavior subject to inflation constraint, we can expect 
real demand variables to increase in the shorter time period, and then 
to decrease during longer period, decrease beefing more intensive 
than the increase. This kind of real demand variables behavior fits well 
to real exchange rate and real incomes dynamics depicted in the first 
section. Moreover, this behavior describes real money changes well, 
suggesting that the real money decline has two components. One is 
well known, and is due to decrease in demand for money in high 
inflation. The second component is due to reserves maximization 
subject to inflation constraint. Monetary authorities adjust rates of 
money supply to rates of nominal depreciation, but when they perceive 
a danger of the upward jump in the rate of inflation, they slow down 
the rates of depreciation and money growth. The structure of changes 
in the high powered money during high inflation in Croatia strongly 




Variables and the estimation procedure 
 
The general form of the model was estimated using monthly data. A 
possible objection to this approach could be based on the fact that 
monthly series almoust inevitably exhibit inertia, which leads to the 
upward bias in the inertial parameter. That objection is valid, but we 
emphasise that we are not trying to test the theory. We are using the 
theory as a leading idea, and we are leaving level effects which maybe 
work at the quarterly or annual level, outside the model. Our referent 
period is a month, a very short term period which is relevant for policy 
making in disinflation. This constraint will lead to very careful 
interpretation of results. 
 
Excess rate of growth of nominal demand was decomposed into a 
foreign and a domestic component. The foreign component was 
constructed following previous analysis, with one modification. Namely, 
there are two mechanisms which transmit exchange rate changes into 
prices. The first is a standard one and is well elaborated in the 
literature (Dornbusch, 1976). Depreciation creates excess demand 
coming from the foreign sector, because domestic prices react slowly 
in comparison with the asset prices, especialy in comparison to the 
price of the foreign currency. The second mechanism is, however, 
specific for high inflation countries and it tends to impede the first 
mechanism due to foreign exchange indexation in the price contracts. 
In order to avoid inflation losses, producers introduce foreign exchange 
clause into price contracts, so that the exchange rate changes can be 
transmitted into domestic prices much faster. However, indexation is 
never pertect in the real world, as we will show in the third section. 
 
In order to capture this considerations, we made a test of the 
hypothesis about the influence of the difference between the expected 
and actual depreciation on prices. Lagged depreciations play a role in 
the expectations forming mechanism which is adaptive on the monthly 
level. Denote expected depreciation in period t as: 
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ete/et-1 = 1/3(et/et-1 + et-1/et-2 + et-2/et-3) 
 
The explanatory variable is named DEXP and can be written as: 
 
DEXPt = (ete/et-1)/(et/et-1) = ete/et 
 
We assume that current prices react to the current difference (ratio) 
between expected and actual depreciation, because in high inflation, 
producers are able to perceive the changes in speed of depreciation at 
the begining of the month. That is also a reason why current 
depreciation enters expectations formula. However, the perception of 
current depreciation at the begining of the month is not perfect, and 
that is the reason why producers form expectations in an adaptive 
way, taking into account the simple average of currently perceived and 
two lagged depreciations. Since actual depreciation is in the 
denominator, increasing difference has to decrease the inflation, and 
the expected sign of variable DEXP is negative. 
 
The second explanatory variable that captures the rate of change of 
excess demand is a domestic one. We named that variable DOMDEM 
(domestic demand), and it captures the effect of differences between 
the rates of change in marginal productivity of labor and rates of 
growth in real incomes. Both series are presented in section 1, and 
details on construction of these variables can be found in the appendix. 
Denote marginal productivity of labor as MPL = dy/dL, and real 
incomes as I/P, so: 
 
DOMDEMt = ((I/P)t / (I/P)t-1) / (MPLt / MPLt-1) 
 
Since rise of real incomes above marginal productivity increases the 
value of DOMDEM, we expect it to have a positive sign. Finally, the 
dependent variable is inflation measured as a simple average of the 
retail price and producers' price inflation. 
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Estimation results are shown in table 1. Two equations have been 
estimated for the same period and by the same method. The 
difference between these equations arises because of introduction of 
credibility dummy variable (DUMCRED) in November 1993-. This 
dummy captures announcement effect of the stabilization programme. 
Both equations contain additional dummy in May 1992. The outlier in 
May 1992 may occur due to supply shocks which are hidden in the 
error term, or due to other demand variables which are also hidden in 
the error term (the role of budget deficit other than public sector 
wages). Constant is omitted in the estimation procedure, because 
underlying theory suggests to do so. 
 
Inflation lagged one period performs very well in both equations, with 
similar coefficients approximately equal to one. This indicates high 
inflation inertia during the period. Proxy for the rate of change of 
domestic excess demand (DOMDEM) performed well only with a 
considerable time lag of five months. In the first equation parameter is 
significant at the .05 level, and in the second equation at the .02 level 
of the two-tail t-test. In the fourth section we discuss the implications 
of the lagged influence of domestic demand. 
 
Difference between actual and expected depreciation plays an 
important imediate role, but is significant only at the 0.20 level in the 
first, and at the .05 level in the second equation. Values of parameters 
in both equations indicate that it's influence is stronger than the lagged 
influence of excess domestic demand. 
 
Monthly inflation equation does not capture the kink in the inflation 
series in November 1993 well. The prime reason is inertia which was 
broken by the announcement (credibility) effect of the stabilization 
programme.9 Variable DUMCRED, which is equal to 1 in November, 
                                                          
9 Recall the discussion in the first section. There we argued that the programme 
was very well designed in order to turn backward-looking into the foreward-looking 
behavior. Therefore, inflationary expectations reduced prior to the disinflation (for 
more about it, see: Agenor and Taylor, 1992). 
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captures that effect. It obviously raises both R2 and adjusted R2 in the 
second equation, and it also raises significance of all explanatory 
variables. However, after introduction of that dummy, we had to reject 
the nul hypothesis about no autocorelation (see t-test for RHO in the 
second equation and the value of Durbin's h test). 
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Finaly, we examined heteroscedasticity problem, because we 
suspected there might be a positive link between values of DEXP and 
the variance. Use of Spearman's rank correlation test shows 
insignificant t-values in both equations, and confirms no 
heteroscedasticity. Goldfield-Quandt's test shows no heteroscedasticity 
at the significance levels of .10 and .01 respectively. 
 
There are four main conclusions arising from this analysis: 
 
1. Croatian inflation was driven by the hysteresis effect, i.e. only 
by inertia and the rates of change effects. Thus it was posible 
for it to go through the high inflation regardless to the GDP 
and unemployment level. 
2. In a situation when monetary authorities control both the 
exchange rate and money supply in order to maximize reserves 
subject to the upper inflation limit, and when an economy in 
high inflation is driven by the hysteresis effect, it is perfectly 
possible for: (a) real money and real exchange rate to move 
along the downvard trend in the long period of time, and 
consequently (b) for an economy to be in a state of the excess 
aggregate supply. This fact is a possible explanation for the 
rather long deflation period after the announcement of the 
stabilization programme. 
3. In the case when the second conclusion holds, cost of 
disinflation will be smaller, if the prices are less rigid 
downwards. If an economy enters the stabilization programme 
regime in a state of excess aggregate supply, either deflation 
or/and real output adjustment can drive such an economy into 
macroeconomic equilibrium. Croatian deflation explains why 
there were no signs of significant real output costs up to now. 
4. Since the rate of change of excess domestic demand influences 
the inflation rate with a considerable time lag, monetary 
authorities are faced to high uncertainity regarding effects of 
their policy in the post-stabilization period. On the one hand, 
demand for money surely increases during disinflation 
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(especially during deflation), but on the other hand, it is 
imposible to make a precise estimate of the demand for money 
in an economy like the Croatian one. In addition to this, the 
economy after disinflation is still sensitive to rates of change, 
and not yet to level effects, so it is posible to induce new 
inflation cycle even if the economy is still in the excess supply 
state. 
 
We elaborate conclusions 2,3 and 4 further in the next two sections, 
and we emphasise the overall conclusion once more. The Croatian 
economy was in the excess supply state for some time in the pre-
disinflation period. Prices were the fastest moving macroeconomic 
variable at least for a year prior to October 1993. 
 
 
3. The role of price contracts: relative price variability 
 
It is not only real money, incomes and real exchange rate decline 
which drove the economy into the excess supply state, that explain 
deflation in Croatia. If prices can fall, that does not mean that they 
would fall. An economy can adjust by output reaction if nominal prices 
are rigid downwards. So, there has to be some initial motive or reason 
for nominal prices to change downwards. 
 
Clearly, it is reasonable to assume that the exchange rate indexation in 
price contracts is widespread in a country with a long history of high 
inflation, and it is therefore reasonable to expect deflation when 
nominal exchange rate apreciates. However, we have to prove these 
arguments. Therefore, a natural way to proceede is to investigate the 
relative price variability. If previous arguments are valid, we expect to 
see a fall, or at least a stagnation in relative price variability when 
inflation reaches high level, and especialy when it oscilates arround the 
upper limit level of 25% for a long time. Calming of the relative price 
variability would mean that those producers who change their prices 
within a given period of time, do it in a similar manner by looking at 
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the same leading information (exchange rate depreciation). Of course, 
relative price variability doesn't have to fall to zero then, because high 
inflation does not necesseraly mean that all producers change their 
prices in the same period (Lack and Tsiddon, 1992). Although 
indexation reduces menu costs of price changes, these costs are still 
present, and there are always some producers who don't change their 
prices within a month. There is a stream of new keynesian literature 
which attempts to explain such pricing behavior (Sheshinski and Weiss, 
1977, 1982; Rotemberg, 1982, 1983; Danziger, 1987; Caplin and 
Spulber, 1987). 
 
Relative price variability is measured as suggested elswhere in the 
literature, by standard deviation of individual price changes arround a 
mean price change (Domberger, 1987): 
 
λt ((1/m) Σ(∆Pit - ∆Pt)2 )1/2 
 
where m denotes the number of individual prices if we measure 
intramarket relative price variability, or the number of individual market 
price indicies if we measure intermarket relative price variability. Price 
changes are expressed in logs: 
 
∆Pit = log(Pit /Pi,t-1) 
 
∆Pt = (1/m)Σlog(Pit/Pi,t-1) 
 
For the purpose of this paper we have measured intermarket relative 
price variability using a sample of 33 individual indices for 33 
manufacturing industries in Croatia. 
 
Figure 8 shows changes in relative price variability on a month to 
month level. Changes in variations are substantial till September 1992. 
Then, for the whole year before stabilization programme was 




This descriptive fact confirms the hypothesis about the higher degree 
of synchronization between prices before the announcement of the 
programme. 
 
The exchange rate depreciation was a crucial information that led to 
higher tacit coordination of individual price changes. In addition to this, 
during this period of small changes in variations, Government allowed 
traditionally regulated prices of energy to be indexed. Moreover, 
indexation coefficients to the depreciation were higher than one. This 
fact allowed relative (real) prices of energy to increase without discrete 
jumps and without significant impact on changes in variations of 
relative prices. Side effect of these developments was a decline in the 
budget deficit. 
 
Having in mind our findings regarding the structure of changes in the 
high powered money and behavior of the real demand variables, it 
follows that deflation could be induced by the kink in the exchange 
rate behavior. And a change in the exchange rate behavior could be 
induced only by an institutional change in the exchange rate regime, 
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i.e by allowing the free foreign exchange market to determine the price 
of the foreign exchange. That was the crucial element of the Croatian 
stabilization programme. 
 
4. Two striking problems for policy makers in the post-
stabilization period: how much did the demand for money 
increase, and is domestic currency "overvalued"? 
 
The whole story about Croatian deflation rests on three facts: 
a) reserves maximization behavior of the monetary autorities 
subject to inflation constraint which drove the economy into 
the excess supply state, 
b) high degree of exchange rate indexation in price contracts, and  
c) announcement effect of the credible programme which turned 
backward looking into the foreward looking behavior, and 
which was supported by an institutional change in the foreign 
exchange regime. 
 
A story like this crucially depends on permanent capital inflow. Croatia 
didn't enjoy any support from the international financial institutions. 
Political and war events in the region made a high risk barrier for 
private capital inflow. Supply of foreign currency came exclusively from 
the household sector. This sector is a net seller at the foreign 
exchange market both in pre-stabilization and post-stabilization period. 
Supply comes from two sources: workers remittances from abroad, 
and shaddow cash (mostly D-mark) savings which were accumulated 
during 70's and 80's and held mostly at home. These are the reasons 
why disposable income in Croatia is much higher than GDP. Current 
outlays of household sector are financed by tranfers and by decrease 
in savings held outside the domestic banking system. Any decrease in 
foreign exchange savings outside domestic banking sector should be 
regarded as capital inflow. 
 
These permanent sources of capital inflow created pressure for 
exchange rate to appreciate, and immediately after the change in the 
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exchange rate regime, they started to play their role. In an economy 
with developed capital markets for open market operations, this 
wouldn't cause problems for monetary authoroties in the post-
stabilization period. A National Bank would be able to act, more or less, 
as a currency board. Exchange rate can be fixed, and National Bank 
can buy all excess supply of foreign currency at a given price. High 
powered money thus increases only because of increase in 
international reserves, and any excess money supply which later occurs 
in higher monetary aggregates, can be sterilized by open market 
operations. However, lack of capital markets creates significant 
problems for policy makers. Possibilities for ex post sterilization are 
imperfect, oscillations in money multiplier are uncertain, and the 
effects of National Bank interventions at the foreign exchange market 
are uncertain, too. 
 
Some intervention is, however, unavoidable. The level of the real 
money at the begining of the programme was extremely low because, 
as we have shown, there have been two components that had 
influenced it's decrease. In the post-stabilization period there are also 
two components which influence increase in the real money balances. 
One is the regular one, and another occurs due to currency 
substitution and is specific for an economy where savings were kept in 
foreign exchange cash. So, any increase in M1 in the poststabilization 
period can contain two components: (a) remonetization component 
which adjusts money supply to higher money demand with no 
inflationary impact, and (b) an excess money supply component which 
may have significant inflationary impact due to underdeveloped 
sterilization instruments. Since policy makers cannot distinguish these 
two components perfectly, i.e. they can do it only with a considerable 
time lag, when inflationary component already influences prices, the 
conduct of monetary policy becomes extremely difficult. With imperfect 
informations regarding two components, policy makers have to rely on 
indirect informations. One way how to do it is to rely on econometric 
estimates like the one we presented in the second section. 
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How can an equation help? At least in three ways. 
 
First, the equation shows that the rate of inflation is sensitive only on 
inertia and rates of change effects. This conclusion holds, at least in 
the short run, for a long time after disinflation. And this fact is a 
warning for policy makers not to think in level terms: don't set policy 
targets such as the share of M1 in GDP comparable to moderate 
inflation times, because the rate of change effect can induce inflation 
at low levels of aggregates, even if the economy is still in the excess 
supply state. 
 
Second, the equation points to the important role of incomes policy. It 
has to prevent discrete jumps in real wages and incomes which can 
push the economy into the spiral after a considerable time lag. 
However, since the economy entered stabilization programme in the 
state of excess supply, a slight increase in the real wages and incomes 
doesn't have to induce inflation. It can only slow down the deflation. 
 
The equation allows us to look at the rates of change in domestic and 
foreign excess demand as substitutes regarding effects on the rate of 
inflation. Possible impact of increased real incomes can be offset by 
nominal appreciation after five periods. Or: posible impact of nominal 
depreciation can be offset by tight incomes policy. We present 
simulation results in order to show possible developments. 
 
We assume zero inflation in the first period, and we assume marginal 
productivity of labor to be constant. We also assume expected and 
actual change in the nominal exchange rate to be equal in the first and 
first minus one period. Variable DOMDEM equals one in five periods 
preceeding first simulation period. Simulations are worked out using 
estimated equation 1. Results for inflation and the real exchange rate 
index are shown in the table below for the period of 12 months. 
 
Simulation 1 shows the results when variables don't change (all are 
equal to 1). These results are crucial because they show that the real 
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exchange rate increases due to continuing deflation. Pressures for 
devaluation and arguments about "overvaluation" of the domestic 
currency are simply misspecified, because they do not take into 
account dynamic effects of price adjustment on a path from excess 
supply state towards equilibrium. As Dornbusch (1976) had shown, 
prices of goods do not adjust as fast as financial assets prices, so after 
initial real apreciation, real exchange rate can depreciate due to price 
adjustment. 
 
The model is, of course, highly artificial, and in reality we expect to see 
changes in variables. What actualy happened in Croatia during the 
post-stabilization period is an increase in real incomes. We worked out 
simulation no.2 under the assumption of doubling real incomes in the 
first month. This highly artificial number is used to ilustrate a case 
where there is no incomes policy, and where post-stabilization 
monetary expansion (which policy makers perceive as remonetization) 
allows significant increase in real incomes. We see that in the first five 
months deflation continues, but after a time lag inflation suddenly 
raises to very high level of almoust 7% per month. Although model 
values of monthly inflation rates slowly decrease after the discrete 
jump, this shock would probably be strong enough to push the 
economy into a new spiral. Real exchange rate decreases, too. 
 
Simulation 3 ilustrates the importance of incomes policy. Doubling of 
real incomes is spread within a year by applying equal monthly rates of 
growth. Obviously, deflation continues, inflation is expected 
somewhere in the second year of the programme, and real exchange 
rate depreciates during the first year, although the depreciation is 
slower than in simulation 1. However, it's not reasonable to expect that 
the rates of growth of real incomes close to 6% won't induce inflation 
in the first year. The equation captures only the rates of change 
effects, and with so high rates economy would enter into excess 
demand state which would pull the prices up much earlier. This effect 
is, however, determined outside the model. Simulation illustrates only 
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the principle which policy makers have to apply: use of smoth rates, 
without discrete shocks. 
 
 
The most important result simulations point to, concerns the exchange 
rate policy. International competitiveness should be gained by price 
adjustment, not by manipulating the nominal exchange rate which has 
to be determined at the market. Even further apreciations due to 
seasonal variations in supply of foreign currency won't impede the 
growth trend of the real exchange rate. This is what was actually going 
on during the post-stabilization period in Croatia (see fig. 3). 
Furthermore, it is imposible to apply economic calculus in order to 
calculate the precise level of non-inflationary remonetization in the 
post-stabilization period. Policy makers can distinguish two 
components of the money supply only imperfectly and ex post, after a 
considerable time lag. That is why monetary authorities should use 
other informations, such as liquidity indicators of the banking system, 
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in order to estimate the optimal level of the money supply. The wrong 
monetary policy would be to look only at the exchange rate in order to 
keep it fixed. This implies endogenous adjustment of the money 
supply. However, in a situation with underdeveloped capital markets 
and imperfect sterilization instruments, this policy is too risky. Money 
supply can overshoot the optimal level and induce new inflation which 
can, due to long inflation history of the country, be caught in the new 




Croatian post-stabilization deflation is a unique story because of unique 
historical circumstances: gaining independency, and building the 
market economy. Independency was gained after a violent dissolution 
of former Yugoslavia, when the Serbian regime attempted to create a 
centralist state using military force. The young country started it's life 
without any international reserves and after severe war damages. All 
of the ex-Yugoslavia foreign exchange reserves were blocked in 
Belgrade. So, monetary authorities decided to permanently adjust all 
control variables in order to build up the reserves. However, price 
reactions of private economic agents constrained that kind of behavior, 
because policy makers didn't want to induce inflation higher than 25%-
30% per month. That is why from time to time they had to slow down 
the rates of growth of the nominal exchange rate and money stock in 
order to prevent explosion of expectations and hyperinflationary spiral 
trap. And that is why the economy entered the state of excess supply 
during 1992. Occasional slowdowns in money growth and depreciation 
were not credible enough to induce any change in pricing behavior. 
Monthly inflation rates were running on high levels, driven exclusively 
by inertia and rates of change effects. Even a change in the structure 
of creation of the high powered money from monetization of deficit 
towards building up the reserves, didn't have any impact on inflation. 
Prices were the fastest moving aggregate at least for a year prior to 
announcement of the stabilization programme. A heterodox 
programme was needed in order to make credible disinflation. 
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Unlike usual monetarists' view, money demand and velocity proved to 
be very sensitive in the short run. However, unlike usual keynesian 
view, prices proved not to be perfectly rigid downvards. In this kind of 
economic environment, no "pure" monetarist or keynesian policy 
recommendation can stand in the middle run. Since nominal prices can 
move downvards in Croatia, policy makers have to exhaust this 
adjustment mechanism before even thinking about some other kind of 
policy, more keynesian in it's nature. However, since money demand 
can significantly change in the very short run, any monetarist 
preannounced money supply rule won't be credible.10 If policy makers 
try to stick to the very restrictive rule from the very begining of the 
programme, they can unnecesarily push the economy deeper into the 
depression. Conclusion holds, of course, if and only if the economy 
enters the stabilization programme regime in the state of the excess 
supply. 
 
Post-stabilization policy making in this kind of economy becomes a sort 
of art. Policy makers' beliefs, attitudes, organizational capabilities, 
educational background and ability to resist lobbying preassures, 
become main determinants of the long run succes of the programme. 
These non-scientific or, more precisely, non-economic factors start to 
play a role instead of missing markets. Missing capital markets for 
open market operations is a strikingly clear example for a situation 
where discretionary decisions based on imperfect informations play a 
role instead of markets. It follows that market developement, especialy 
capital markets development which stands beyond the scope of this 
paper, is a primary task for policy makers in order to reduce the high 
degree of uncertanity in the system and to ease the burden of tough 
choices which make the probability of policy errors much higher. 
 
Although the Croatian disinflation experience is quite specific and can 
be usefull only for countries which enter the stabilization programme in 
the state of the excess supply (which is probably quite rare), the last 
conclusion holds for all ex-socialist countries. 
                                                          
10 Money supply rule which was announced in October 1993 was not obeyed at all. 
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